Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

Linda M. May v. George H. May : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors. C.C. Patterson; Attorney for Plaintiff-RespondentStephen W.
Farr; Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, May v. May, No. 17079 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2358

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN rHE SU?'tEME COURT OF THE
STJl.'i'E OF UTAH

LINDA M. i'lAY,

I

Plaint if:: ancl
Res '.londent,

I
I

vs.

Case No,

I

.;EORGE H. 1'1'.AY'
Defendant and
Appellant.

17079

I
I
/,

BRIEF OF Ai.'PELT..A.NT

Appeal from judgment of thl! Second Judkial
District Court of the State .of Utah, in .lqllllt
for the County of Davis, Hor.or able 'Thor'n.ely IL
Swan, Judge.
·

FARR, KAUFMl-1.M & ~~
STEPP.EN ·w. JtAJI.,
Bamberger SCJ.uarf1
205 26th Street,(
Ogden, Utah 8ti.40l
AttornPy for Def
C.

C. PATTEi\.SON

427 27t:h Street
OgdeL, Utah 04401
Attorney for Plaintiff ~Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

{

Hl THE SUPREMF COUF.T OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

LINDA M. MAY,

I

Plaintiff and
r.espondent'

I
I

vs.

Case No.

I

GEORGE H. MAY,
Defendant and
Appellant.

I
I

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from judgment of the Second Judicial
District Court of the State of Utah, in and
for the County of Davis, Honorable Thornely K.
Swan, Judge.

FARR, KAUF!1AN & f!.Al1ILTON
STEPP.EN W. FARR, ESQ.
Bamberger Souare, Building 1
205 26th Street, Suite 34
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
C. C. PATTERSON
427 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE ................................. 1
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT .............. ,., .... 1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ...... , ................. , ... l
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................. , , . , , , ..... , , .. 2
ARGIB1ENT ...... , ........... , ...... , . , ... , , . , .. , . , , , ,
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO GRANT TFE CONTINUANCE REQUESTED
BY APPELLANT .... , , . , .. , , ... , .... , . , ... , , ... , , . 4
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN APPLYINE;
A REPEALED STATUTE TO THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY .... 11
CONCLUSION, , , , ... , . , . , . , ...... , , . , , .. , . , , .. , . , . , , . . 11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE CITATIONS

Bingham v. Bin~ham,
575 P. Zd 703Utah, 1978} ............................ 11
Dunn v. McKay, Burton, .McMurray & Thurman,
584 P. 2d 894 (Utah, 1978) ............................ 5
Griffiths v. Hammon,
560 P. 2d 1375 (Utah, 1977) ........................... 4
Henderson v. Henderson,
576 P. Zd 1289 (Utah, 1978) ........................... 11
Maltby v. Cox Construction Co., Inc.,
598 P. 2d 336 (Utah, 1979) ................. , .......... 5
Mageary v. Ho!t,
91 Anz. 41,69 P. 2d 662 ............................ 8
Un~ar

37

v. Sarafite,
U.S. 575 (1964) ................................... 9, 10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

LINDA M. MAY,

I

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

I
I

VS.

I

GEORGE H. MAY,
Defendant and
Appellant.

Case No.

I
I

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in divorce where custody of the
parties' minor child was the main point of controversy.
DISPOSITION IN TEE LOWER COURT
On March 20, 1980, the matter was tried before the
Honorable Thornley K. Swan, sitting without a jury.

Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law, along with a Decree of Divorce
were signed April 7, 1980, and filed April 8, 1980. ·The
Decree of Divorce to become final thirty (30) days after
entry.

The decision of the court as nemorialized in the Decree

of Divorce incorporated the parties' oral stipulation regarding
property division and child support, and further granted
custody of the minor child to the respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellent seeks to reverse and remand the decision
of the District Court.
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STATEMEl:I' OF F.ACTS
On or about August 30, 1979, the respondent filed
an action for divorce in the District Court in and for Davis
County (R. 1-5).

In response to the respondent's action,

appellant answered and filed a Counter-Affidavit to rebut
the allegations of respondent's Affidavit in connection with
her Order to Show Cause (R. 8-15).
On October 25, 1979, a Show Cause hearing was held
before the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, and the parties orally
stipulated as to the necessary terms (R. 20),
On January 28, 1980, the parties and their
respective counsel appeared before the Honorable Thornley K.
Swan for a Pre-Trial Conference.

The minute entry for the

conference specifically notes that counsel conferred with the
court and stipulated that a home study be made by the Division
of Family Services, with each party to pay one-half of the
cost of the study (R. 26).
Subsequent to the Pre-Trial Conference, the appellant
attempted to contact his attorney on several occasions prior
to the trial.

Appellant left messages for his counsel to

return his telephone calls and none were returned until one
day before the trial.

On returning appellant's telephone

call, his counsel advised appellant that he would not appear
in court for the trial due to a fee dispute (R. 41).

When

the appellant retained counsel he paid Three Rundred ($300.00)
Dollars to the attorney after being advised that Three Hundred
-2-
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($300.00) Dollars, plus costs, was his fee for representation
in appellant's case.

Later counsel demanded an additional

Three Hundred ($300.00) Dollars from appellant and represented
he would not attend the trial without payment,
Appellant's counsel indicated to appellant that due to the
fee dispute, he would contact the court and seek permission to
withdraw from the case and further, seek a continuance to
permit appellant to find new counsel.

Appellant's counsel did

contact the court and was informed that neither requst would
be granted (R 31, 47),

Appellant, not being aware of the

court's decision, attempted to reach his attorney to determine
how the matter would proceed,

Arpellant was unsuccessful in

reaching his lawyer; however, late that afternoon, Hr. White's
secretary called appellant and advised him that the judge would
not allow the continuance and would not allow Hr. \..'hite to
withdraw from the case.

The secretary further informed

appellant that she did not know whether Mr, White was going to
attend the trial (R, 422.
Upon hearing the representations of lfr, White's
secretary, appellant made efforts to reach those witnesses he
wished to testify on his behalf, although he had no subpoenas,
nor was he familiar with the process involved in their service,
During the hectic hours, appellant rer:iained uncertain whether his
attorney would attend the trial (R. 42},
The following day, at the time set for the trial,
Mr. White did appear, but was reluctant to represent the
appellant due to the differences regarding fees.
-3-

Appellant
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informed the court of the problems and sought a continuance
based upon the fact that his counsel had not adequately
prepared appellant's case in failing to subpoena certain
witnesses that appellant desired and that were crucial for
the custody issue; further, that counsel was not desirous
of representing appellant and that thereby he could not have
a fair trial.
The relief sought by appellant was denied and the
trial took place without the witnesses crucial for appellant,
Subsequently appellant obtained new counsel,

A

Motion for a New Trial and Affidavit in support thereof were
then filed on appellant's behalf (R, 41-44L,

Counter-Affidavits

were filed by respondent and appellant's former counsel and
the matter came before Judge Swan on April 15 1 1980 (R. 54L,
On April 23, 1980, the court denied appellant's Motion and
an Order reflecting the decision was filed on April 25, l980
(R,

62L.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRF.TION IN FAILING TO GRANT
CONTINUAHCE REQUESTED BY APPELLANT.
It is well settled that the decision on whether to
grant a request for continuance is within the discretion of
the trial court.

In Griffiths v, Har=on, 560 P, 2d 1375

(Utah, l979L, the Utah Supreme Court announced:
A party is not granted a continuance as
a matter of right, but rather as an action
of discretion by the court., ,560 P, 2d at 1376,
-4-
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In the case at bar the trial court abused its discretion in
permitting the trial to take place, and thus denying appellant
a fair hearing.
Our legal system is founded upon the notion that
everyone is entitled to be heard.

An important part of the

right to be heard is the right to counsel.

Obviously, the

right to counsel in civil cases must be viewed differently than
in criminal cases; however, proper assistance of counsel is
necessary in both realms.
Proper assistance of counsel was not afforded the
appellant at the trial of the divorce action and the failure
resulted in great loss to the appellant; namely, loss of
custody of his child.

While it is not appellant's contention

that he should be afforded a new trial due to incompetence 1
of counsel, appellant certainly was entitled to have the trial
of this matter continued when the trial court was advised of
the extreme difficulties between

a~pellant

and his attorney,

difficulties that would, and did, prejudice appellant.
It is unouestioned th~t there is an implied
covenant in an attorney's relationship to
his client that he wili represent th~client's
interest with competence and diligence.
Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman,
584 P. Zd (Utah, 1978)
In appellant's case, diligence was not the watchword, and the
lack thereof was called to the attention of the trial court.

1.
The Utah Supreme Court in Haltbv v. Cox Construction Co., Inc., 598 P. 2d 336 (Utah, 1979}, in dicta
announced that incompetence of counsel in a civil case was
not the grounds for a new trial.

-5-
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The

trial court was advised by appellant that he was not certain
whether counsel was even going to attend the trial on March 20,
1980.

Appellant's concern was occasioned by the events and

conversations before the trial between appellant, his counsel,
and his counsel's office.
Appellant was advised by counsel that his fee for
representing appellant in the subject matter would be Three
Hundred ($300.00) Dollars, plus costs.

Pursuant to that

representation, appellant tendered the requested sum and
assumed he had representation for the duration of the lawsuit.
The representation was not always characterized by cooperative
effort.

Appellant attempted to reach his counsel on many

occasions prior to the time set for trial, but was unsuccessful (R. 41, 57).

Finally, one day before trial, appellant's

counsel returned a telephone call and advised appellant he
would not appear at trial without an additional Three Hundred
($300.00) Dollars, and further suggested that the matter be
settled (R. 57).
Appellant and his counsel were apparently unable to
resolve their differences regarding fees and counsel unequivocally stated he would not appear at trial and would contact
the judged regarding a withdrawal (R. 57).

In response,

appellant indicated he would need time to obtain new counsel and
asked Mr. White to request a continuance.

Mr, White replied

that the trial court would probably grant the continuance and
that he would call the appellant later that morning with an
answer.

Appellant awaited a telephone call throughout the
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morning, and later telephoned Mr. White's office several times,
all to no avail.

Later that evening appellant received a call

from Hr. White's office and was told the trial court had refused
both the withdrawal and continuance requests.

!>fr. White's

secretary further advised appellant that she did not know
i f Mr. 1.'"hite would appear in court the following day.

It was not until appellant appeared in court the
next morning that he knew whether or not Mr. \-.nit e would be
present to represent him (R. 57}.

Although Mr, White was

present in court, the evidence that appellant sought to
introduce was neither prepared nor available,

After the

Pre-Trial hearing, appellant had advised counsel that he did
not wish to rely on the home study evaluation as the sole
determinant for custody; rather, he desired to produce
evidence at the time of trial which would relate to appellant's
fitness as a custodial parent, and the lack of fitness on
the part of the respondent,

Appellant further communicated

the nature of his evidence, and those persons whose attendance
should be secured to his attorney.
Appellant advised Mr. White at the original
interview that he wished to contest the divorce, particularly
the issue of custody,
otherwise.

At no time did appellant advise counsel

Appellant indicated that some witnesses were

reluctant to testify, and would probably require a subpoena,
Despite appellant's representations, counsel did not discuss
witness fees, prepare subpoenas, or converse with the witnesses
that did appear in court prior to their testifyin3,

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Mageary v, Hoyt, 91 Ariz. 41, 369 P. 2d 6E2 (1962)

1

the

Arizona Supreme Court dealt with art action against an attorney
for constructive fraud allegedly arising out of the attorney's
failure to inform the plaintiffs (his former clientsL of a
discrepancy in an assignment contract, \·1hich plaintiffs claimed
caused them to fail to extend a lease,

The trial court

granted surmnary judgment on behalf of the defendant-lawyer,
but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that
questions of fact existed as to whether the attorney used
reasonable skill and knowledge, the nature of the employment
contract and the question of

proxiJ:r~te

cause,

In so ruling

it was noted that:
Certainly an attorney owes a duty of
utmost good faith to his client, and must inform
his client of matters that flight adversely affect
his client's interest, Sarti v, Udall,
91 Ariz. 24, 369 P. 2d 92 (19621 369: P, 2d
at 665
The logic of the Mageary decision is certainly applicable
herein where the failure to advise the appellant whether or not
witnesses had been subpoenaed, whether or not additional
costs were involved, or whether or not counsel would attend
trial, ult:illlately prejudiced the appellant to such an extent
as to deprive him of a fair hearing,

This failure to prepare

evidence on appellant's behalf, was called to the trial court's
attention by appellant at the time that a continuance was
requested (T. 14-l8},

In that vein appellant stated:

I would like to ask for a continuance in this
matter, I haven't had time to seek other legal
assistance, and feel that ny best interests,: ..
-8-
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Well, I haven't had a chance to represent
my best interests in this matter. I haven't
had time to prepare a case myself personally.
Mr. White, more or less, wasn't allowed to
withdraw, and under the circumstances between
him and me I don't feel we were able to get
together what was needed, as far as evidence
by today.
(T. 14 to 15).
A lengthy discussion on the record followed between counsel,
the trial court and the appellant, including the testimony
of the appellant, wherein appellant represented to the court 1
in detail, the difficultieE he had encountered with ris
attorney and the lack of key witnesses crucial to his case.
(T.

14 to 41)
The court had been ma.de aware of the difficulties

prior to the time of trial, and still failed to grant the.
continuance to the appellant.

The minute entry of Harch 20,

1980, specifically notes that Mr. vlhite contacted the trial
judge one day prior to the trial and requested permission to
withdraw (R. 3l-32).

The decision reacred by the trinl coi.;rt

deprived appellant of a fair hearing and worked a great
injustice,
The judiciary is naturally concerned with the adin.inistration of a great number of cases and the need to complete
hearings as scheduled; however:
. . . . a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness
in the fact of a justifiable request for delay
can render the request to defendant with
counsel an empty fonnality,
Ungar v. Sarafite,
376 U.S. 515, 589 (19641 referring to Chandler v,
Fretag, 348 U.S. 3

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Fhile Ungar 2 involved a criminal contempt matter 1 the
language quoted above is equally applicable to the case at
bar.

The trial court, in an attempt to administer its case-

load, rejected a justifiable reouest for continuance,
There are no mechanical tests for deciding
when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary
as to violate due process, The answer must
be formed in the circumstances uresent in every
case particularly in the reason presented to
the trial judge at the time the request is
denied. Nilva v. U.S., 352 U,S, 388
Ungar v, Sarafite, Supra at 589
The facts in this case show a justifiable request for a
continuance that was denied through abuse of discretion,
causing the appellant to be denied a fair hearing,
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN APPLYING A RE:PF.ALED
STATUTE TO TFE ISSUE OF CUSTODY
Prior to the 1977 revision,

30~3~10

of the

Utah Code authorized the court, in its decision of custody
in divorce matters to consider the "natural presUI!lption
that the mother is best suited to care for the young
children".

The legislature's decision to remove that

presu:nption from the law is part of a societal attempt to
remove the badges of sexism in considering such matters,

TO.is

2, Ungar v. Sarafite, Suh:i;a, involved a defendant
charged with criminal contempt for is conduct as a witness
in a state criminal trial, The Supreme Court found no abuse
of discretion in denying the defendant's request for a
continuance, even though his claim was that evidence was not
available; however, the evidence was easilv obtainable
within a matter of hours and defendant had' already received
nu:nerous continuances.
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court has announced its support of the change in the law
and stated:
.... under the modern trend of social thinking
away from former fixed rigidities, towards
equality of the sexes and greater flexibility
in considering the qualifications of the parents
on an individual basis, that presumption is
subordinate to the higher rule that the
paramount concern in such cases is the best
interest and welfare of the child.
Bingham v. Bingham, 575 P. 2nd 703, 704
(Utah, 1978)
In appellant's Affidavit in support of his Notion for New
Trial (R. 41-44), appellant states that" .... the court
advised me, following the trial that 'Utah Statutes show
tbe woman preference over the man in custody cases'".

While

the court did not make such a cormnent on the record it is
a matter properly before this court for review, in light
of appellant's Affidavit.

Obviously, the trial court

committed error in reaching its decision on custody based upon
a repealed section of the Utah Code.
Custody determinations, being a matter related to
divorce, are matters of equity and the court is "necessarily
. h great d'iscretion
. " .3
c 1 ot h e d wit

That great discretion

does not permit the court to base its decision on erroneous
interpretations of the law,

Therefore, the trial court's

determination was must be overturned.
CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion in failing
to grant the requested continuance and thus committed error

3. Henderson v. Henderson, 576 P 2d 1289
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in rendering its decision on custody,
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the
trial court should be reversed,
Respectfully submitted
FARR, KAUHW1 & BAMILTON

By:

CERTIFICATE OF HAILIHG
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed to

plaintiff-respondent's attorney, C, C, PATTERSON, Attoni.ey
at Law, 427 27th Street, Ogden, Utah, postage prepaid, this
;)-;;>----day of September, 1980.

Secretary
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